

From simple log to sophisticated crypter

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About Us

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


Agenda


- Encountering an Unknown Crypter
- The Crypter's Internals
- Hunting The Crypter's Uses:
 - NFT Campaign
 - Babadeda Against Ukraine
- Summary and Q&A

What a Crypter is?


- A program whose goal is to hide the real intentions of a piece of code.
- It does so by using:
 - Encryption
 - Obfuscation
 - Execution manipulation
 - o More ...



The Story Begins With




VirusTotal






The Crypter Internals

- Crypter Infection chain
 - Installer
 - Executable
 - Main DLL + Modules
 - First stage shellcode
 - "Decryption shellcode"
 - Second stage shellcode
 - "Injection shellcode"



The Crypter Internals



XML File

Why BABADEDA?

```
payload_pe_address = (IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *)@xBABADEDA;
payload_pe_size = @xDEADBEAF;
payload_optional_header = get_image_optional_header((IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *)@xBABADEDA);
get_nt_header((IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *)@xBABADEDA);
get_image_section_header((IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *)@xBABADEDA);
new_size_of_image = payload_optional_header->SizeOfImage;
current_exe_peb = get_ntcurrpeb();
get_ntcurrteb();
current_exe_address = (IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *)current_exe_peb->ImageBaseAddress;
current_exe_address = (IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *)current_exe_ldr_list_entry(current_exe_peb);
new_pe_target_entry_point = (char *)current_exe_address + optional_header->AddressOfEntryPoint;
VirtualProtect = (void (__stdcall *)(IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *, DWORD, MACRO_PAGE, int *))get_func_by_hash_w(new_pe_target_entry_point);
```

- OxDEADBEAF Used as a magic debug value
- OxBABADEDA In Russian is: Grandma, Grandpa

What makes it so evasive?

- Code logic splitted into several different DLLs
- The code resides in bunch of legitimate application code.
- In newer variants the main DLL is loaded using DLL side-loading technique.
- Encrypted payload and shellcode.

WHAT SHOULD WE DO NEXT?

Analysis

BABADEDA Crypter

WannaCry

TrickBot

Emotet

Qakbot

Research




Collecting More Samples

- Translate your knowledge to YARA Rule
- Use your own telemetry as well as open source resources

```
rule BABADEDA Crypter
   meta:
       description = "Detects BABADEDA Crypter"
        author = "Morphisec labs"
       reference = "https://blog.morphisec.com/
       the-babadeda-crypter-targeting-crypto-nft--defi-communities"
   strings:
       $placeholder 1 = {8138DADEBABA}
   $placeholder 2 = {8138AFBEADDE}
       $entry shellcode = {55 8B EC 83 EC 58 53 E8 F8 03 00 00 89 45 FC 8B 45 FC
       83 C0 11 89 45 CC 8B 45 FC 8B 40 09 8B 4D CC 8D 04}
   condition:
       $entry_shellcode and all of ($placeholder_*)
```

Pipeline Overview


Samples Collection



What we are looking for?

- Sample source
- Network activity
- Final payload classification

smokeloader	https://savixtothenation.co.ug/index.php		
smokeloader	http://savixtothenation.co.ug/index.php		
remcos	193.56.29.242:4783		
metasploit			
gozi_ifsb			
fickerstealer	prunerflowershop.com:80		
fickerstealer	prunerflowershop.com:80		
danabot	192.119.110.73:443		
danabot	192.236.147.159:443		
danabot	192.210.222.88:443		
cryptbot	veowvf15.top		
cryptbot	morysl01.top		





Home	Date	Packer/Crypter	Payload	C2	port	er •
	11/2020 - 07/2021	Custom .NET packer	Remcos	95.217.114[.]96 37.48.89[.]8 94.23.218[.]87	4782 4783	
	07/2021 - 08/2021	Crypto Obfuscator (.NET)	Remcos	135.181.17[.]47	4783	
	08/2021 - 10/2021	BABADEDA	BitRAT	135.181.140[.]182 135.181.140[.]153 135.181.6[.]215	7777	
/	11/2021 - 12/2021	BABADEDA using DLL sideloading with IIS Express	Remcos AsyncRAT	65.21.127[.]164	4783 4449	
	12/2021 - *Active	BABADEDA using DLL sideloading with Adobe/TopoEdit	Remcos	193.56.29[.]242	4783	
▶ DeBank	01/2022 - *Active	BABADEDA using DLL sideloading with Link.exe	Remcos	157.90.1.54	4783	l 🕝


WHY DO WE PUBLISH OUR WORK?

Research Side-effects

TA Activity



BABADEDA Against Ukraine



Key takeaways

- Understand the threat landscape your working with
- Look at the bigger picture
- Understand what steps are required to achieve each goal
- Use automations to make your analysis easier
- Share your findings and make use of others researches

Thank You



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